Runtime security
Confinement, capability reduction, descriptor ownership, and deterministic cleanup across process and hypervisor boundaries.
- Kata Containers
- Capsicum
- Linux namespaces
Independent systems security engineering
I work across kernel telemetry, workload identity, protocol state machines, and open-source control planes. The goal is simple: make every security-relevant transition explicit, bounded, and testable.
SYSTEM TRACE
STATIC / HTTPS01 / RESEARCH AREAS
Each track starts from a concrete trust boundary and ends with an observable verification condition.
Confinement, capability reduction, descriptor ownership, and deterministic cleanup across process and hypervisor boundaries.
cgroup-scoped execution evidence, datapath state machines, conntrack contracts, and evidence-loss handling.
Guest-host interfaces, workload byte preservation, lifecycle ordering, and bounded execution surfaces.
RFC 5280 path constraints, SPIFFE identity, PKINIT and Kerberos boundaries, authenticated transport metadata.
02 / UPSTREAM PATCH INDEX
Verified merges and current reviews across runtime, identity, protocol, and platform boundaries.
Extended Gateway API backend transport validation so GRPC routing follows the same authenticated upstream contract.
View merged patchKept field-extraction failures visible across the libsinsp plugin boundary instead of collapsing the diagnostic state.
View merged patchBound CA rotation and issued SVID lifetimes to the verified upstream X.509 chain expiry.
View merged patchStopped compressed-name pointer cycles with explicit traversal bounds while preserving valid nested labels.
View merged patchAligned finding-group list visibility with product authorization, including groups without findings.
View merged patchAdded optional HMAC-SHA256 authentication over the exact bytes transmitted to webhook consumers.
View merged patchEnforced path-length and issuer-validity constraints in certificate-chain verification.
View merged patchReturns the exact validated key and value slices so guest policy does not mutate approved bytes.
Inspect reviewTracks multipart form bytes separately from streamed files across reject and partial-processing paths.
Inspect reviewIncludes encapsulated payload padding in checksum length and pseudo-header accounting.
Inspect reviewPreserves acknowledged byte coverage when block-size negotiation changes the transfer geometry.
Inspect reviewAdds SHA-384 schemes to the default NSE TLS offer while preserving version and key-type constraints.
Inspect reviewValidates descriptor bounds and detaches listener state safely before releasing the descriptor slot.
Inspect reviewRequires in-process grant levels and preload grants to allow the same operation when both are active.
Inspect review03 / LAB NOTEBOOK
Project-owned fixtures and isolated systems turn architecture assumptions into evidence.
04 / ENGINEERING IDENTITY
I am an independent systems security engineer based in Turkey. My work favors narrow patches, explicit ownership rules, and regression tests that preserve the boundary where the original failure occurred.
Research statements are scoped to project-owned fixtures, disposable lab systems, or upstream test suites. Platform limitations are recorded instead of being silently generalized.
05 / CONTACT
For project-specific engineering correspondence, start from the relevant issue or patch. For general contact, use the canonical GitHub account.
Open GitHub profile